A number of theoretical studies predict an unconditional negative association between firm risk premium and firm disclosure, where additional disclosure reduces estimation risk or information asymmetry. Empirical studies based on these models frequently report mixed results. Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) propose a model where the effect of disclosure on risk premium differs based on the firm's long-term growth rate relative to a threshold rate, which reflects the relative importance of short-term cash flows and long-term cash flows. When the long-term growth rate exceeds the threshold, greater disclosure increases the firm's risk premium, rather than decreasing it. Motivated by the findings in their model, we estimate four long-term growth rate thresholds and reexamine the relation between risk premium and disclosure conditional on those thresholds. We provide evidence that the association between risk premium and disclosure is positive (negative) for firms with long-term growth rates above (below) a threshold long-term growth rate, as predicted by Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) .
Introduction
A broad theoretical and empirical literature examines the link between firm disclosure and a firm's risk premium. 1 A number of theoretical studies predict that better disclosure will be negatively associated with a firm's risk premium, wherein the uncertainty surrounding future expected cash flows, and their riskiness, is reduced through firm-provided disclosures (e.g., Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995; Christensen, de la Rosa and Feltham, 2010; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007; Easley and O'Hara, 2004) . Even so, the empirical evidence in this area is somewhat mixed. For example, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find that a firm's expected return is negatively associated with better annual report disclosure but positively associated with better quarterly disclosures, a more timely source of financial information. Similarly, Richardson and Welker (2001) find that higher quantity and quality of financial disclosures is negatively associated with a firm's expected returns, but the opposite is true when a firm provides more extensive social disclosures. In a recent theoretical paper, Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) build on this earlier work, using a dynamic model to explore the potential role that firm growth plays in explaining the contradictory empirical findings. Instead of assuming that post-disclosure cash flows are consumed, they expand the traditional framework to include the preferences of overlapping generations of investors and show that the effect of disclosure quality on risk premium is conditional on the firm's longterm growth rate. In this study, we provide empirical evidence consistent with the propositions in Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) , demonstrating that the mixed findings about the association between disclosure and expected returns from prior studies are likely explained by the interaction with growth. In doing so, we extend our understanding of the critical link between firm disclosure and risk premium. Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) model the effects of information disclosure on risk premium and investor welfare in a setting where an infinitely lived firm is owned by overlapping generations of riskaverse investors. The return to each generation of investors has two components -cash flows distributed as dividends, and the capital gains that accrue from the sale of the firm to the next generation -and the cash flows associated with both short-term and long-term components are uncertain. 2 More informative disclosure is expected to reduce the uncertainty around the cash flows distributed as dividends, leading to a negative correlation between disclosure quality and the risk premium related to these dividend payments. At the same time, however, more informative disclosure might decrease or increase uncertainty about the capital gains component: when the long-term growth rate of the firm exceeds some threshold (e.g., the risk-free rate or the growth rate of GDP), better disclosure will increase, rather than decrease, the uncertainty about those future cash flows. 3 Thus the measured link between risk premium and disclosure -which incorporates both the association of disclosure with dividend risk and the association of disclosure with the capital gains risk -is a function of a firm's expected long-term growth rate. Two factors come into play in this process. First, when the long-term growth rate exceeds the threshold, the association between the expected rate of return on the capital gain and disclosure is positive, rather than negative. Second, higher expected long-term growth results in a larger (smaller) weight being put on the capital gain (dividend) portion of firm value. The net effect of these factors can be either positive or negative, which suggests that the empirical association between risk premiums and disclosure quality depends on expected long-term growth rates. In short, while most prior work predicts a consistent negative association between risk premium and disclosure, the Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) model proposes that the association between disclosure and risk premium for firms with higher long-term growth rates will be positive (or less negative than for firms with lower long-term growth rates). We empirically examine this proposition.
We use information from 8Ks filed by firms with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to create five measures of firm-level disclosure, including one designed to capture a firm's disclosure policy. For comparability with prior work, our sixth disclosure measure uses management 2 While we use the term 'dividends' to be consistent with the Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) model when referring to the short-term cash flow component, we believe that the intuition of the model also extends to short-term 'earnings.' 3 As Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) note (p. 417) , this effect stems from the force identified in Hirshleifer (1971) , where the disclosure of new information reduces current shareholders' insurance against share price fluctuations.
forecast data. We measure firm-specific risk premium using two implied cost of capital methods (priceearnings-to-growth, and forward earnings-to-price) and a characteristics-based expected return measure, as well as realized returns. To measure firm growth rates and calculate the implied cost of capital measures, we collect forecasted long-term growth rates from I/B/E/S. Our primary sample includes a broad cross-section of firms -over 70,000 firm-quarters with I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts that file 8Ks from 2001 to 2013.
In univariate analysis of the full sample, we find generally negative correlations between firm disclosure and risk premium for three of our risk premium proxies, and positive correlations for the fourth proxy based on realized returns. We then partition the sample based on different long-term growth rate thresholds and find evidence that the relation between firm disclosure and risk premium is a function of the firm's long-term growth rate relative to a threshold. While the association between disclosure and risk premium is not consistently negative for any of the risk premium measures across the partitions, we find that the association between disclosure and risk premium increases (i.e., the association becomes more positive or less negative) as the forecasted long-term growth rate increases. This pattern holds when we use most of our disclosure measures and three of our four proxies for risk premium.
Our multivariate analyses provide additional insight into the role that long-term growth rates play in explaining whether the measured relation between disclosure and risk premium is positive or negative.
In specifications that control for industry and quarter fixed effects but do not condition on growth, we find a positive relation between disclosure and risk premium. Subsequent regressions of risk premium on disclosure include the interaction of long-term growth rates with disclosure, and results indicate that the positive relation between risk premium and disclosure is moderated for observations with low rates of long-term growth. Our analysis also provides evidence on the association between risk premiums and all types of disclosures, whether mandatory or voluntary. While most of the prior work in this area focuses on voluntary disclosures, the theoretical predictions in Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) relate to disclosure "regimes," which correspond well with mandatory disclosures and firms' established disclosure policies.
Overall, our results provide support for Dutta and Nezlobin's predictions. We also highlight the importance of examining a broad set of firm disclosure measures-when we rely on a managementforecast-based disclosure measure, we observe a limited association between disclosure and risk premium. The weaker association could be attributable to the management-forecast-based measure being restricted to a particular set of voluntary disclosures that include a forecasted value, in contrast with the broader set of disclosures contained in the other measures. Similarly, when we rely on realized returns to measure risk premium, we document a negative association between disclosure and risk premium across the full sample, even after controlling for cash flow news. While realized returns are frequently used as a proxy for expected returns, much of this work relies on portfolios, rather than firm-specific realized returns. Our findings could be affected by the noise in realized returns or an inability to properly control for cash flow news and discount rate news. It is also possible that realized returns are less connected to fundamentals.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses background literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Literature review and hypotheses development

Literature review
Many theoretical studies in the accounting and finance literature suggest that a firm's expected return is negatively associated with disclosure (e.g., Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995; Christensen et al., 2010; Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Hughes Liu, and Liu, 2007; Lambert et al., 2007) , as more disclosure decreases both the investors' uncertainty about future cash flows and their required rate of return. These models focus on the association between disclosure and the expected returns in a single, post-disclosure, period. In these settings, an investor's risk premium is decreasing in the precision of the information received about the forthcoming cash flows. At the end of the period, the cash flows are consumed.
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In contrast, Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) model a setting where information disclosure affects the investor's risk premium for holding the firm when part of the cash flows (labeled dividends) are received in a post-disclosure period (after a disclosure is made) and the remaining cash flows (labeled capital gains) are received from selling the firm to the next generation in a pre-disclosure period (prior to an additional disclosure being made). The conditional variance of the capital gains portion of firm value will be a function of the firm's anticipated disclosure. When the firm's expected growth rate exceeds a threshold, higher quality disclosure increases the uncertainty of the capital gain cash flows, rather than decreasing it. Ultimately, each generation's investors face a risk premium composed of a weighted average of the post-disclosure risk premium and the pre-disclosure risk premium. The relative strengths of those relationships determine a firm's overall risk premium.
There is also a significant stream of empirical research that seeks to document the predicted negative association between disclosure quality and risk premium, with somewhat conflicting results. For example, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) examine the association between firm expected returns and three related measures of firm disclosure quality based on survey data from the AIMR. While they document a significant negative association between expected returns and higher quality annual report disclosure for their sample, they also report an unexpected negative association between expected returns and higher quality quarterly and more timely disclosures. Likewise, Richardson and Welker (2001) examine the link between a firm's expected return and the quantity and quality of its financial and social disclosures.
Similar to the mixed findings in Botosan and Plumlee (2002) , Richardson and Welker (2001) find their predicted negative association between financial disclosures and expected return but also report a "statistically reliable positive association" between enhanced social disclosures and expected returns.
Hypotheses development
As discussed above, while several empirical studies provide evidence that the association between firm disclosure and expected returns is not always negative, much of the prior theoretical literature supports a negative association. The multi-period model in Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) extends this literature by providing conditions under which disclosure quality can have a positive association with risk premium. Consistent with earlier theoretical work (e.g., Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007) the relation between the risk premium on the short-term cash flows and disclosure is negative.
However, the relation between disclosure and the expected risk premium on the long-term cash flows is conditional on the expected growth of those cash flows. Since the risk premium measured at each point in time is a weighted average of the risk premium related to the short-term and long-term cash flows, the relation with disclosure depends crucially on expected growth. Specifically, Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) condition the relation between disclosure and risk premium on whether the expected long-term growth rate for the firm exceeds a certain threshold, which they assume to be the risk-free rate. In our empirical analysis, we also consider whether the growth threshold varies across time and across industries. This leads to our primary hypothesis:
The association between disclosure and risk premium for firms with long-term growth rates below a threshold is negative, or less positive, than for firms with long-term growth rates above that threshold.
Sample selection and research design
Sample selection
We start our sample selection process with 108,097 firm quarters from the intersection of Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S. We include all observations from January of 2001 through December of 2013 with non-missing returns, earnings, and analysts' earnings forecast data. Our primary disclosure measures are based on data drawn from 8K filings available on the SEC's Edgar website, so we eliminate firm-quarter observations that are missing these data (11,308 observations). 6 In some cases we are unable to estimate our expected risk premium measures due to missing data items; this reduces our sample by 13,574 observations. Finally, we eliminate firms with current period losses or forecasted losses (11,451 firm-quarters or 13.7% of the total sample including loss firms) because risk premium estimates for loss firms are difficult to interpret. Our primary sample includes 71,764 observations from the first calendar quarter in 2001 through the fourth calendar quarter in 2013 (52 quarters). When our analyses use the frequency of management forecasts as the disclosure measure, we lose an additional 12,529 observations.
Panel A of Table 1 details the sample selection process. Panels B and C present the industry and year breakdown for our sample. We use the Fama-French 17 industry classification to determine industry affiliation of firms. The largest industry representation is for services and other (27.7%), finance (21.4%), and machinery (12.5%), and the smallest industry representation is for fabricated products (0.7%) and mining (0.7%). We also report the industry representations for the entire CRSP-Compustat merged universe of firms and note that the industry breakdown for our sample is quite similar. Our sample is distributed evenly across the 13-year period, with no more than 10% of the sample falling in a single year.
Research design
We use both univariate and multivariate analyses to examine the relation between disclosure and risk premium conditional on a firm's expected growth rate relative to a long-term growth rate threshold.
Our analysis requires measures of three primary variables: risk premium, disclosure quality, and a longterm growth rate threshold. We discuss our proxies for each of these variables below. We also provide details about our multivariate model.
Risk premium measures
We estimate firm-specific risk premiums using four different methodologies drawn from prior literature. We use two measures from the implied cost of capital literature, a characteristics-based expected return measure, and realized returns. Our first measure is based on the Price-Earnings-toGrowth, PEG, method (Easton, 2004) . The findings in Botosan and Plumlee (2005) , where is the median I/B/E/S long-term growth forecast.
Our second measure, RPFEP, is calculated as the inverse of the forward price-to-earnings ratio less the risk-free rate. A vast body of literature in accounting (Beaver, 1970) has measured expected rate of return using the earnings-to-price ratio (E/P or earnings yield), which we modify to incorporate longerterm forward earnings (i.e., Forward Earnings-to-Price). Specifically, we estimate RPFEP as:
where [ ] is the longer-term earnings forecast calculated as before in the estimation of RPPEG.
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Our third measure, RPCER, is Characteristics-based Expected Returns (CER) less the risk-free rate.
This returns-based risk premium measure is motivated by findings in accounting and finance literature that firm characteristics, many of which are based on accounting fundamentals, explain cross-sectional variation in returns (for example, see Penman and Zhu, 2016; Penman, Reggiani, Richardson and Tuna, 7 We repeat our analyses using one-and two-year-ahead forecasts instead of longer-term earnings forecasts when estimating risk premiums and find similar results.
2015; Lyle, Callen and Elliott, 2013; Lewellen, 2015; and Bessembinder, Cooper and Zhang, 2016 Our final measure, RPRR, is realized stock returns over the subsequent 12 months less the risk-free rate. Since realized returns are being used as a proxy for expected returns, we also control for cash flow news over the subsequent 12 months when using this risk premium measure.
Disclosure measures
We consider six measures of disclosure in our study: five 8K-based measures and one based on management forecasts. Our first disclosure measure is the number of 8Ks filed in the prior year, consistent with measures used in previous work (e.g., Leuz and Schrand, 2009; Li, 2013; Balakrishnan, Core, and Verdi, 2014; Guay, Samuels, and Taylor, 2016 Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008) . Thus, as part of our analysis, we measure voluntary and mandatory disclosure separately and examine whether the association between disclosure and risk premium differs according to the type of disclosure. Finally, while our 8K-based disclosure measures, particularly TDisc, capture a comprehensive set of firm disclosures, the amount of firm-specific news disclosed in the 8K seems likely to be correlated with the underlying economic activity at the firm.
That is, we may observe more disclosures simply because more activity is going on at the firm. In our fifth 8K-based measure, we attempt to adjust for the level of activity at the firm to provide a measure of the firm's disclosure policy.
The 8K filings we use to construct these measures are available via EDGAR on the SEC's website. We use these data and the technique developed in Cooper et al. (2016) to construct four of the measures. 8KCount is the number of 8Ks filed by a firm during the 12-month period prior to the date the risk premium is estimated. TDisc is the total number of reportable items disclosed in the 8Ks issued by a firm during the 12-month period prior to the date the risk premium is estimated. VDisc and MDisc are the number of voluntary and mandatory reportable items disclosed in the 8Ks issued by a firm during the 12-month period prior to the date the risk premium is estimated. We follow Cooper et al. (2016) are a function of events transpiring at the firm. Thus, the higher the frequency of 8K-worthy reportable events happening at the firm, the more the firm needs to disclose mandatorily. However, the voluntary disclosure of additional 8K items, conditional on the mandatory 8K disclosures, is a choice of the firm and can be viewed as a measure of discretionary disclosure policy. We regress VDisc on MDisc for each firm using the eight previous quarters in order to estimate a time-varying measure of disclosure policy.
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The magnitude of the coefficient captures the additional disclosures a firm chooses to make, given its mandatory disclosures.
Our PDisc measure is intended to capture a firm-specific disclosure policy, so it focuses on voluntary disclosures. However, the Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) model describes both past and anticipated disclosures, so the measure of disclosure quality should be consistent over time. In considering the link between voluntary disclosure and risk premium, prior research frequently relies on a firm's commitment to disclosure as the mechanism that gives rise to a reduction in information asymmetry and the resulting cost of equity capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) . 10 Here, we examine quarter-to-quarter persistence in the estimated coefficient to provide a measure of the consistency of the disclosure choice. We find that the coefficient is fairly persistent at the firm level and on average in the cross-section. Thus, we view the PDisc coefficient as representing the level of disclosure the firm makes on an ongoing basis. The highest PDisc quartile is interpreted as higher quality ongoing disclosure.
Our final measure is the number of management forecasts provided by a firm in the previous 12 months, similar to prior studies (e.g., Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008; Guay et al., 2016; Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, and Marshall, 2015) . While the management forecast measure is restricted to a specific type of voluntary disclosure and is not available for all sample firms, we include it in our analysis to 9 To construct this measure, we require eight quarters of VDisc and MDisc data, and we also lose the first eight quarters for each firm when estimating the first coefficient in the rolling regression. As a result, we are able to estimate this disclosure measure for approximately 70% of our sample firms (2,639 out of 3,737 unique firms), and the number of firm-quarter observations is lower. The sample size is reduced from 71,764 firm-quarters to 49,293 firm-quarters. 10 For example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) define disclosure in their model as "The disclosure can be interpreted as a choice of an accounting technique or a committed policy of making earnings or other forecasts." Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) explore whether committing to a higher level of disclosure through adopting IAS or US GAAP impacts bid-ask spreads.
(Emphases added).
facilitate comparison with prior literature. 11 As with most of our other measures, we use a simple count of management forecasts to measure disclosure rather than conditioning on the actual information content of the disclosure. FreqMF is the number of management forecasts issued during the 12-month period prior to the date the risk premium is estimated (e.g., Guay et al., 2016). As we calculate this measure for the subset of firms included in the I/B/E/S Guidance database from Thomson Reuters, it is available only for firms that have issued at least one such forecast during the sample period.
Long-term growth rate thresholds
Our analysis requires us to estimate a threshold long-term growth rate that is expected to trigger a positive rather than negative association between disclosure and the risk premium. We consider four potential long-term growth rate thresholds. To form the first threshold, we rank all observations within each of the 52 sample quarters into quartiles (lowest, second, third, and highest LTG), based on the I/B/E/S long-term growth rate forecast at that point in time. Observations in the lowest long-term growth quartile are considered to have growth rates below the threshold cross-sectional long-term growth rate (we refer to this threshold as "Cross-Sectional LTG"). 12 This process does not generate a single value for the long-term growth rate threshold across the entire sample, but instead allows for that threshold to vary across the 52 sample quarters. The second threshold is generated by refining the process that generated the cross-sectional long-term growth rate threshold -we again rank observations within each sample quarter into quartiles based on the I/B/E/S long-term growth rate, but in this case the ranking is done within each of the Fama-French 17 industries. 13 We use within-industry rankings on long-term growth because we are concerned that the cross-sectional sorts on long-term growth might be unduly influenced by high or low growth industries -specifically, to the extent that high growth (low growth) firms cluster in certain high growth (low growth) industries, our sorts on growth may be, in effect, sorting on industries.
This process also allows us to control for industry differences in risk premium in determining the longterm growth rate threshold. For each of the 52 sample quarters, we combine the observations from each quartile across all industries. Observations in each of the lowest within-industry long-term growth rate quartiles are considered to have growth rates below the industry-adjusted long-term growth rate threshold (we refer to this threshold as "Within-Industry LTG"). Again, this process does not generate a set threshold for the full sample, but instead allows for that threshold to vary across the 52 quarters and by industry.
The other two long-term growth rate thresholds, the risk-free rate and GDP growth, are based on economy-wide factors. Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) show that, when cash flows are serially uncorrelated, the long-term growth rate threshold is the risk-free rate (p. 420); accordingly, we use the long-term risk free rate (i.e., the yield on 10-year US Treasury Bonds) as our third threshold. Finally, given the importance of the macroeconomic environment and business cycles in influencing firm-level earnings growth, we use GDP growth as the fourth long-term growth rate threshold. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the calculations for each long-term growth rate threshold.
Multivariate model
As noted earlier, we use both univariate and multivariate analysis to provide evidence on the role played by long-term growth rates in explaining the association between disclosure and risk premiums.
Our multivariate model is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2008; Plumlee et al., 2015) that examine the unconditional association between disclosure and risk premiums. Specifically, we estimate the following cross-sectional model for each risk premium measure (k) and each disclosure measure (j):
where
RPk
One of the four risk premium measures discussed above.
Disclosurej
One of the six disclosure measures discussed above.
BelowThreshold
An indicator variable that equals one when the firm belongs to a group with long-term growth below one of the four long-term growth rate thresholds discussed above, zero otherwise.
BelowThreshold × Disclosure Interaction between the BelowThreshold indicator and Disclosure. This is the main variable of interest.
Size Natural logarithm of market value of equity as of the end of the last fiscal period.
Beta
Firm-specific CAPM beta estimated for each quarter using rolling regressions of firm returns on the value-weighted market index returns over the prior 36 months (minimum of 24 months required).
Leverage
Leverage calculated as long-term liabilities scaled by total assets.
B/P
The book-to-price ratio computed as book value of common equity at the end of the last fiscal period scaled by market value of equity.
The dependent variable in our tests is one of the four risk premium measures, and the explanatory variable Disclosure is one of the six disclosure measures. We operationalize the Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) long-term growth rate thresholds using an indicator variable (BelowThreshold) to capture the set of observations that have long-term growth rates below the threshold values, using one of the four long-term growth thresholds discussed above. This indicator variable is interacted with Disclosure. The primary explanatory variables of interest are Disclosure and its interaction with the indicator variable (BelowThreshold). We predict that the interaction variable (BelowThreshold × Disclosure), which captures the association between disclosure and risk premium for firms with long-term growth rates below the threshold value, will be negatively associated with risk premium. We expect that the association between disclosure and risk premium for firms classified as having growth rates that exceed the threshold will be positive.
Consistent with prior studies that examine the association between risk premium and disclosure, we also include several control variables: Size, Beta, Leverage, and B/P. Size is the log of market value of equity at the end of the prior fiscal year. Beta is the CAPM beta, which is the coefficient from a regression of firm-specific returns on the value-weighted market index returns. Leverage is total longterm liabilities scaled by total assets. B/P is the firm's book value of equity scaled by market value of equity. These variables control for firm-specific characteristics that theory and prior studies suggest are associated with disclosure and risk premium. We expect that Size (Beta, Lev, B/P) will be negatively (positively) associated with risk premium. We incorporate an additional variable (CFNews) to control for cash flow news (Botosan et al., 2011) when we employ RPRR as the dependent measure. prior findings, we document large differences in the cross-sectional variation of these measures; the standard deviation of the risk premium proxies ranges from a low of 0.036 (RPPEG) to a high of 0.420
Results
Descriptive statistics
We also document substantial differences in the means, medians, and standard deviations of the disclosure measures. 8KCount has a mean (median) value of 11.29 (10.0), which is comparable to the values reported in Balakrishnan et al. (2014) 14 The lowest and highest long-term growth quartiles are obtained from quarterly sorts of all firms on the basis of I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts. Looking at the descriptive statistics for these two quartiles, we observe that mean and median RPPEG are lower in the lowest long-term growth quartile than in the highest long-term growth quartile. The opposite is true for mean and median values of RPFEP and RPRR, while mean and median values of RPCER are very similar across the lowest and highest growth quartiles. When we examine disclosure, however, we find that the values of all five of the 8K-based measures are higher in the lowest long-term growth quartile than in the highest long-term growth quartile.
The opposite is true for FreqMF. We also find that firm observations classified in the lowest long-term growth quartile are larger and more levered, and have lower Beta and higher B/P ratios, than firms in the highest long-term growth quartile.
Finally, Panel C of Table 2 presents median values for the variables across the 17 Fama-French 14 In untabulated analysis we also calculate descriptive statistics for observations partitioned by within-industry long-term growth.
The results are substantively similar to those presented in Panel B based on cross-sectional long-term growth.
industries. As expected, we document differences in the risk premium and disclosure measures, as well as long-term growth rates, across the 17 industries. These findings are consistent with prior work (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 2001 ) and with practitioner views (e.g., Duff and Phelps, 2015) . The cross-industry variation suggests that controlling for industry may be important as we estimate the longterm growth rate threshold. We also report generally negative associations between three of the risk premium measures (RPPEG, RPCER and RPRR) and the disclosure measures, consistent with the unconditional negative association between disclosure and expected returns suggested by prior research. (PDisc is positively associated with RPRR, and FreqMF is positively associated with RPPEG and RPRR.) However, RPFEP is positively associated with five of the six disclosure measures. We also find that forecasted long-term growth is negatively associated with the disclosure measures (except FreqMF). Finally, we find that forecasted long-term growth is positively (negatively) associated with RPPEG (RPFEP), and is also mostly negatively associated with RPCER and RPRR. 
Univariate analyses
We begin our analysis by presenting correlations between risk premium and disclosure across quartiles of long-term growth. Table 4 reports the correlations between each of the four measures of risk premium and each of the six disclosure measures. We partition the sample based on the four long-term growth rates we use to create growth thresholds: cross-sectional LTG, within-industry LTG, long-term risk-free rate, and GDP growth period.
The first six rows in the table, below the number of observations, present correlations between RPPEG and the disclosure measures, the next six rows present correlations between RPFEP and the disclosure measures, the following six rows present correlations between RPCER and the disclosure measures, and the last six rows present correlations between RPRR and the disclosure measures. We reproduce the full sample correlations from Table 3 in column (1) of Table 4 to simplify comparisons with the partitioned correlations. Columns (2) through (5) report the correlations by cross-sectional LTG quartile (from the lowest to the highest quartile). Columns (6) through (9) report the correlations by within-industry LTG quartile (from the lowest to the highest quartile). Columns (10) and (11) report the correlations when we partition based on whether the firm-specific long-term growth forecast is below or above the prevailing risk-free rate. The final two columns present correlations for the observations where 16 In particular, we note that the Pearson correlation between forecasted long-term growth and RPCER is negative while the Spearman correlation is positive. However, neither correlation is statistically significant at conventional levels.
GDP growth for the period is in the lowest (highest) quartile of GDP growth rates across the sample period.
When we partition based on the cross-sectional LTG quartiles (columns (2)- (5)), the results using RPPEG and RPCER to estimate risk premium tell a consistent story. The correlations between these two risk premium measures and the five 8K-based disclosure measures are negative, but generally increasing, across the lowest three quartiles. In the highest LTG quartile, the correlation is positive for RPPEG and mostly positive for RPCER. The correlations between RPFEP and the first four disclosure measures show the same systematic increase across the growth quartiles. In this case, the correlations are all positive, but they are increasing in magnitude. 17 These systematic changes in the correlations are consistent with our hypothesis based on the Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) model, and they highlight the importance of controlling for long-term growth rates in examining the relation between risk premium and disclosures. In contrast with these results, however, when we use realized returns as a proxy for expected risk premium or we measure disclosure using only management forecasts, the correlations between risk premium and disclosure across the LTG quartiles are generally decreasing.
The results based on our second method of estimating the long-term growth rate threshold (Within-Industry LTG) show a similar increasing pattern to those based on Cross-Sectional LTG. Across the four within-industry LTG quartiles (columns (6)- (9)), we again find that the correlations between three of the risk premium measures (RPPEG, RPCER and RPFEP) and the 8K-based disclosure measures are generally increasing with the long-term growth rates. For example, when we rely on RPPEG to estimate the risk premium, we document negative correlations between risk premium and disclosure in the three lowest within-industry LTG quartiles (two lowest quartiles when PDisc is employed). The sign of the correlation becomes positive in the highest within-industry LTG quartile. The results when we use realized returns (RPRR) to estimate risk premium or management forecasts to estimate disclosure are similar to those reported above: the correlations between risk premium and disclosure are decreasing or 17 The correlations between RPFEP and PDisc are all positive, but not strictly increasing.
unrelated across within-industry LTG partitions.
A comparison of the results for the first two growth partitions suggests that industry growth rates affect the growth rate threshold. Focusing on the results using RPPEG and the 8K-based disclosure measures, we note that while the correlations are negative for the lowest quartile, positive for the highest quartile, and increasing across the four quartiles for both growth partitions, correlations in the second and third quartiles are generally of opposite sign for the two partitions. When the forecasted long-term growth rate is calculated relative to industry, only firms in the highest long-term growth quartile consistently show a positive correlation between risk premium and disclosure; for the other three quartiles, disclosure is negatively correlated with risk premium on average. In contrast, when we use quarterly cross-sectional growth rates to determine growth quartiles, the average correlation between risk premium and disclosure is positive for all but the lowest growth quartile.
The results based on the final two methods of estimating the long-term growth rate threshold suggest that these thresholds are less informative. When we use the risk-free rate to partition the sample, the vast majority of our observations (almost 70,000 of the 71,764 sample observations) are classified as having long-term growth rates that exceed the threshold. Even so, we generally find that the correlation between the risk premium and disclosure for the set of firms with lower long-term growth rates is lower (and frequently negative) than for the set of firms with higher long-term growth rates. The results based on sorting firms into lowest and highest growth quartiles based on GDP growth (columns (12) and (13)) are somewhat mixed.
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Overall, the results presented in Table 4 support a link between long-term growth rates and the sign of the association between a firm's risk premium and disclosure based on a cross-sectional or withinindustry LTG threshold. These results are based on three risk premium proxies (RPPEG, RPCER and RPFEP) and are consistent across 8K-based disclosure measures. The failure to document a link using RPRR and with FreqMF likely reflects issues with these measures that have been identified in earlier work.
Estimating risk premium using realized returns -particularly without controlling for cash flow newssuffers from the concerns raised in a number of prior studies (e.g., Elton, 1999; Botosan et al., 2011) .
Likewise, the limitations of management forecasts as a comprehensive measure of disclosure have been well documented (e.g., Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010) .
Multivariate analyses
We begin our multivariate analysis by presenting the results of an empirical specification similar to the regression models used in prior studies. As Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) highlight in motivating their model, the prior empirical work examining the relation between disclosure and risk premium tends to report mixed results. In addition, much of this work examines voluntary disclosure using relatively small samples, often during limited time periods.
19 By contrast, we consider both voluntary and mandatory disclosure for all firms that file 8Ks with the SEC from 2001 to 2013. Thus, to provide a comparison with prior work (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2008) , our first regression examines the unconditional association between risk premium and TDisc, the most comprehensive of our 8K-based disclosure measures. In addition to providing a baseline for our subsequent analysis, these results document the relation between the risk premium and a broad disclosure measure that incorporates both mandatory and voluntary reports.
We present a set of results for each of the four risk premium measures in Table 5 . For each risk premium measure, we present four sets of regression coefficients and t-statistics that differ in terms of how we control for time-series and cross-sectional dependence. Specifically, in the first column of each set of results (columns (1), (5), (9) and (13)), we present the mean of the coefficients from the crosssectional regressions estimated each sample quarter. The t-statistics are formed using the mean and 19 Many of these studies rely on hand-collected measures of disclosure (e.g., Francis et al., 2008; Plumlee et al., 2015) or disclosure measures that are available for a limited set of firms (e.g., Clarkson, Fang, Li, and Richardson, 2013; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Richardson and Welker, 2001) , which generally limits the sample size. In addition, these disclosure measures generally focus on a single source for disclosure (e.g., annual reports, sustainability reports, management earnings forecasts). (2), (6), (10), (14) and columns (3), (7), (11), (15) (4), (8), (12) and (16) We present our primary results in Table 6 . Drawing on the univariate associations presented in Table 2 , Panel B, we use the third quartile of long-term growth rates to operationalize the growth threshold -i.e., the growth rate above which we expect firm disclosure will be positively associated with risk premium. Panel A reports results when we use cross-sectional long-term growth rates (CrossSectional LTG) to measure the growth threshold, and Panel B reports the results when the within-industry long-term growth rate (Within-Industry LTG) is used. The model predicts that firms with long-term growth rates below the LTG threshold will benefit from increased disclosure, such that the association between the risk premium and the interaction of BelowThreshold and TDisc will be negative. Increased disclosure by other firms -those with long-term growth rates above the long-term growth thresholdwill be positively associated with risk premium.
In identifies firms that are BelowThreshold. These associations are statistically significant except in the pooled RPFEP and RPCER models. As in Panel A, the associations when we measure risk premium using RPRR are opposite of our expectations, even after controlling for cash flow news. These findings may be attributable to the noise in realized returns as a measure of expected returns (Elton, 1999) , particularly given our inability to control for discount rate news.
20
To provide a visual representation of the associations between disclosure and risk premiums, in Figures 1 and 2 we plot the time series of the coefficient on disclosure from quarterly cross-sectional regressions using RPPEG as the dependent variable. We present the time series for each of our six disclosure measures (Panels A -F). In each panel of Figure 1 , we plot the time series for observations where the long-term growth rate falls in the lowest quartile of cross-sectional long-term growth rates (in 20 Botosan et al. (2011) examine the efficacy of using realized returns after controlling for cash flow news as a proxy for risk premium. Their findings suggest that this measure performs worse than a risk premium proxy based on the PEG method. grey) and for the rest of the sample (in black). Within each of the panels, we also report the proportion of the sample where the coefficient on the disclosure measure is negative. Figure 2 presents analogous charts when within-industry long-term growth rates are used.
Across Panels A -D of Figure 1 , the lowest LTG subsample coefficients are consistently lower than the coefficients for the rest of the sample. More importantly, across Panels A -E the coefficients for the lowest LTG sample are consistently negative for most of the sample periods, while the coefficients for the rest of the sample regressions are positive. These trends are confirmed by the high proportion of the lowest LTG quartile with negative coefficients. Specifically, up to 80.8 percent of the coefficients in the lowest LTG sample are negative (when only mandatory disclosures are considered), while the highest proportion of negative coefficients within the rest of the sample is less than 8 percent for the 8K-based disclosure measures. While we do not specifically examine issues related to mandatory and voluntary disclosures, it is interesting to note differences in the impact of the long-term growth rate threshold when disclosure is limited to either mandatory or voluntary disclosures. The results presented in Panel Fwith management forecasts as our measure of disclosure -differ substantially from those based on our other measures, although we still document a higher proportion of negative coefficients in the lowest LTG subsample than in the rest of the sample.
The plots in Figure 2 share many of the characteristics of those in Figure 1 . Like Panels A -D of Figure 1 , Panels A -D of Figure 2 show that the lowest within-industry LTG subsample coefficients are consistently lower than the coefficients for the rest of the sample. However, the rest of the sample has larger frequency of negatives than in Figure 1 . This pattern is similar to the univariate results, where the negative correlations are not restricted to the lowest quartile for within-industry. Further, we observe greater variation in the magnitudes of the coefficients, both positive and negative across Panels A -D.
Finally, the reported proportion of negative coefficients across Panels A -E are substantively similar to the values in Figure 1 . Panel F results show that coefficients are mostly positive for both groups -and more consistently so than in Figure 1 -when management forecasts are the measure of disclosure.
In the two final tables, we expand our analysis by examining the association between risk premium and our other disclosure measures in the multivariate regression framework. In Table 7 , we report analyses using High PDisc instead of TDisc to measure disclosure. As discussed earlier, PDisc is intended to capture a firm-specific disclosure policy conditioned on the underlying activity at the firm.
Within each quarter, we use PDisc to rank firms into quartiles and set High PDisc equal to one if the firm's PDisc is in the top quartile for the quarter. We use quartiles rather than the continuous variable (PDisc) because while the estimated PDisc coefficients are noisy, we expect the assignment to quartiles to be relatively stable. As in the Table 6 analysis, the model predicts that firms with long-term growth rates below the LTG threshold will benefit from increased disclosure, such that the relation between risk premium and the interaction of BelowThreshold and High PDisc will be negative. Increased disclosure by other firms -those with long-term growth rates above the long-term growth threshold -will be positively associated with risk premium.
In columns (1) - (2) we present results when the threshold is based on a cross-sectional long-term growth rate. Columns (3) -(4) report results when the threshold is based on a within-industry long-term growth rate. We document significant positive associations between High PDisc and RPPEG in three of the four specifications. More importantly, we document negative associations between RPPEG and both
Lowest LTG Quartile and the interaction between High PDisc and Lowest LTG Quartile, where Lowest
LTG Quartile identifies firms that are BelowThreshold. These results are consistent with our expectations and the effects posited by Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) . We do not tabulate results for the other risk premium measures, but we find the results for RPFEP and RPCER to be directionally similar to those for RPPEG, although generally insignificant. The associations when we measure risk premium using RPRR are opposite of our expectations, however, even after controlling for cash flow news. Our results are similar across both threshold specifications, although the results are somewhat stronger in columns (3) -(4) when the threshold is based on within-industry long-term growth rates.
In Table 8 Panels A and B, we examine the association between RPPEG and the other four measures of disclosure, after controlling for growth thresholds. Panel A reports results based on the lowest cross-sectional long-term growth threshold, while Panel B reports results based on the lowest within-industry long-term growth quartile. In column (1) we use 8KCount as our measure of disclosure.
Columns (2) and (3) report results with VDisc as the disclosure measure, with and without a control for
MDisc. In column (4) we include MDisc on its own, and in column (5) we use FreqMF. The results here support our univariate findings and the relation posited in the Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) paper.
Specifically, we document negative associations between disclosure and risk premium for observations with growth rates below the long-term growth threshold and positive associations between disclosure and risk premium when they are above the long-term growth threshold. The findings in Panel B are similar to those in Panel A. As in Table 6 , the coefficients in Panel B are both larger in magnitude and more statistically significant than in Panel A, although the underlying relationship is the same. However, consistent with our earlier findings related to FreqMF, we find that, even in a multivariate setting, the sign of the association between FreqMF and risk premium is inconsistent with our expectations.
Conclusions
We reexamine the association between firm disclosure and firm risk premium, relying on the findings in Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) to guide our analysis. Using their theoretical framework, we estimate four potential long-term growth rate thresholds, where the association between disclosure and firm risk premium for firms with long-term growth rates that exceed (are less than) that threshold is expected to be positive (negative). We calculate disclosure measures for a broad cross-section of firms and, using those measures, provide evidence that the firm's long-term growth rate is an important factor in understanding how disclosure affects risk premium.
The primary results from our study are based on a firm's overall disclosure, which includes both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. We also construct a measure of firm-specific disclosure policy and use it to sort firms according to the level of disclosure the firm makes on an ongoing basis. We provide evidence that the predicted association between risk premium and disclosure is explained by differences in our estimated disclosure policy measure. Our analysis provides some evidence that the nature of the risk premium/disclosure relation differs across voluntary and mandatory disclosure types. For example, we find that the associations between risk premium and mandatory disclosure for the lowest LTG firms are more frequently negative (80.8 percent of the time) than for voluntary disclosure (53.8 percent of the time) (see Figure 1 ). This result raises new questions relative to the prior theoretical and empirical research that frequently focuses on the link between voluntary disclosure and risk premium.
Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Variables Descriptions
Risk Premium Measures: Risk Premium
We use four different methodologies to estimate firm-specific expected returns over the subsequent 12-month horizon, and compute the risk premium (RP) as the expected returns in excess of the short-term risk-free rate ( ). The risk-free rate is collected from Kenneth French's website.
RPPEG
The expected returns based on the Price-Earnings-to-Growth, PEG, method (Easton, 2004) less the risk-free rate calculated as:
[ 12 ] is the constant horizon 12-month-ahead I/B/E/S earnings forecast for each firm (i) every quarter (t), which is calculated by time-weighting the I/B/E/S consensus annual earnings forecasts for the one-year-ahead (F1) and two-year-ahead (F2) periods. Specifically,
, where the weights ( , ) are based on the number of days between the forecast date and the fiscal period end date for the firm's one-yearahead forecast, divided by 365 days.
[ ] is the longer-term earnings forecast for each firm, estimated using the median I/B/E/S long-term growth forecast (LTG) as:
RPFEP Expected returns measured using the earnings yield (earnings-to-price) method (Beaver, 1970) , modified to incorporate longer term earnings forecasts less the risk-free rate. We calculate Forward E/P (FEP) as follows:
] is the longer term earnings forecast as calculated RPCER Characteristics-based Expected Returns (CER) less the risk-free rate (also see Penman and Zhu, 2016; Penman et al., 2015; Lyle et al., 2013; Lewellen, 2015; and Bessembinder et al., 2016) . Expected returns are the predicted values from a quarterly cross-sectional regression of 12-month-ahead realized stock returns on time t firm characteristics including size, realized earnings-to-price, forward earnings-to-price, book-to-price, beta, leverage and return on equity: The estimated quarterly coefficients and each firm's quarterly characteristics are used to compute the 12-month-ahead predicted, or expected, return.
RPRR
Realized stock returns over the subsequent 12 months less the risk-free rate. In multivariate analysis, we also control for cash flow news using revisions in analyst earnings expectations over the subsequent 12 months.
Variables Descriptions
Disclosure Measures: 8KCount A count of 8K filings over the prior 12 months (Leuz and Schrand, 2009 ).
TDisc
Total disclosure, based on the items disclosed within 8K filings over the prior 12 months (Cooper, He, and Plumlee, 2016) .
VDisc
Voluntary disclosure, based on voluntary items disclosed within 8K filings over the prior 12 months (Cooper, He, and Plumlee, 2016) .
MDisc
Mandatory disclosure, based on other than voluntary items disclosed within 8K filings over the prior 12 months (Cooper, He, and Plumlee, 2016) .
PDisc
A estimated measure of the firm's disclosure policy, based on the 1 coefficient from the following rolling-window regression for each firm using the previous 8 quarters of data:
FreqMF
Voluntary disclosure, based on the number of management forecasts for sales, earnings, and other items issued over the prior 12 months (Guay et al., 2016) .
Growth Measures / Thresholds For Partitions:
LTG
The firm-specific median long-term growth (LTG) forecast in I/B/E/S. We use the long-term growth forecasts in two ways:
(1) each quarter we sort firms into quartiles on the basis of LTG using the crosssection of the entire sample (i.e., Cross-Sectional LTG Quartile).
(2) each quarter we sort firms into quartiles on the basis of LTG within each of the 17 industries in our sample, and then combine firms in each quartile across industries (i.e., Within-Industry LTG Quartile).
LT Risk-Free Rate
The quarterly long-term risk-free rate (GS10) collected from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
GDP Growth
Annual GDP growth over the most recent quarter with data collected from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Additional Variables:
Size Natural logarithm of market value of equity at fiscal period end.
Beta
Firm-specific beta is estimated using rolling regressions of firm returns on the value-weighted market index returns over the prior 36 months (minimum of 24 months).
Leverage
B/P
The book-to-price ratio computed as book value of common equity at the end of each fiscal period scaled by market value of equity.
CFNews
Changes in expectations of future earnings growth (i.e., cash flow news) over the subsequent 12 months estimated using revisions in the 12-month-ahead I/B/E/S earnings forecast:
Figure 1. The Relation Between Risk Premium and Disclosure
These figures plot the time series of the coefficient on disclosure from quarterly cross-sectional regressions of risk premium on various measures of disclosure. Specifically, the following model is estimated each quarter for each disclosure measure (j):
RPPEG is risk premium based on the price-earnings-to-growth method, less the risk-free rate. Disclosure measures are computed over the 12-month period prior to the date the risk premium measure is estimated. 8KCount is the number of 8-Ks filed, TDisc is the total number of items disclosed in the firm's 8-K filings, VDisc (MDisc) is the total number of items classified as voluntary (not classified as voluntary) disclosed in the firm's 8-K filings. PDisc is the firm's estimated disclosure policy, and FreqMF is the total number of management forecasts for sales, earnings and other items. Lowest LTG refers to firms in the lowest LTG quartile when sorted on the basis of long-term growth using the cross-section of the entire sample. Rest of Sample refers to the firms other than those in the lowest LTG quartile. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses for the pooled sample, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the highest and lowest long-term growth quartiles. Each quarter we sort all firms in the crosssection on the basis of I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts into the highest and lowest quartile. Panel C presents medians of the main variables by industry. RPPEG is risk premium based on the price-earnings-to-growth method, RPFEP is risk premium based on the forward earnings-to-price method, RPCER is risk premium using the characteristics-based expected returns method, and RPRR is risk premium based on realized subsequent returns. 8KCount is the number of 8-Ks filed in the 12-month period prior to the date the expected risk premium measures are estimated. TDisc is the total number of items disclosed in the firm's 8-K filings over the 12 months prior to the date the risk premium measures are estimated. VDisc (MDisc) is the total number of items classified as voluntary (not classified as voluntary) disclosed in the firm's 8-K filings over the 12 months prior to the date the risk premium measures are estimated. PDisc is the firm's estimated disclosure policy, and is the coefficient on MDisc from the following rolling-window regression: , = 0 + 1 , + using the previous 8 quarters of data. The additional data requirements to estimate the 1 coefficient reduces the sample size to 49,293 firm-quarters for this variable. FreqMF is the number of management forecasts issued in the 12 months prior to the date the risk premium measures are estimated. LTG is the median I/B/E/S long-term growth forecast. Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity, Beta is the beta coefficient from a rolling regression of firm returns on market returns over the prior 36 months, Leverage is leverage computed as long-term liabilities scaled by total assets, B/P is the book-to-price ratio computed as book value of common equity scaled by market value of equity, and CFNews is cash flow news measured using revisions in equity analyst expectations of future earnings growth over the subsequent 12 months. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the variables included in the study. Columns 2 through 5 report the RP-Disclosure correlation for the sample partitioned each quarter into quartiles on the basis of long-term growth (i.e., Cross-Sectional LTG Quartiles). Columns 6 through 9 report the RP-Disclosure correlation for the sample partitioned into quartiles on the basis of industry long-term growth within each industry. Each quarter we sort firms into quartiles on the basis of long-term growth within each of the 17 industries, and then combine the firms in each quartile across industries (i.e., Within-Industry LTG Quartiles). Columns 10 and 11 partition the sample based whether the firm-specific LTG forecast is below or above the long-term risk-free rate. Columns 12 and 13 partition the time period covered by the sample into the lowest and highest quartile of GDP growth. See Appendix A for descriptions of variables. RPPEG is risk premium based on the price-earnings-to-growth method, RPFEP is risk premium based on the forward earnings-to-price method, RPCER is risk premium using the characteristics-based expected returns method and RPRR is risk premium based on realized returns. Disclosure is measured using TDisc, which is the total number of items disclosed in the firm's 8-K filings over the 12-month period prior to the date the risk premium measures are estimated. Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity, Beta is the beta coefficient from a rolling regression of firm returns on market returns over the prior 36 months, Leverage is leverage computed as long-term liabilities scaled by total assets, B/P is the book-to-price ratio computed as book value of common equity scaled by market value of equity. CFNews is cash flow news measured using revisions in equity analyst expectations of future earnings growth over the subsequent 12 months. This additional control variable is included when the risk premium measure is based on realized returns. In columns (1), (5) (9) and (13) Fama-Macbeth (FMB) regressions were used and these columns report the average coefficients and R 2 from quarterly cross-sectional regressions with Newey-West t-statistics. In pooled regressions the t-statistics reported are based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for descriptions of variables.
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Growth Threshold Partitions
(1) 
RPPEG is risk premium based on the price-earnings-to-growth method, RPFEP is risk premium based on the forward earnings-to-price method, RPCER is risk premium using the characteristics-based expected returns method, and RPRR is risk premium based on realized returns. TDisc is the total number of items disclosed in the firm's 8-K filings computed over the 12-month period prior to the date the risk premium measures are estimated. In Panels A and B we use two groups of firms identified as being BelowThreshold. Lowest Cross-Sectional LTG Quartile is an indicator for whether the firm is in the lowest quartile of I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts. Each quarter we sort firms into quartiles on the basis of long-term growth and then combine the firms in the lowest quartile. Lowest Within-Industry LTG Quartile is an indicator for whether the firm is in the lowest quartile of I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts within its industry. Each quarter we sort firms into quartiles on the basis of their long-term growth within each industry, and then combine the firms in the lowest quartile across all industries into one group. The control variables Xt include Size, Beta, Leverage, and B/P in all specifications and CFNews is added when the dependent variable is RPRR. The t-statistics reported are based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. In columns (1), (3) and (5) of both panels we use Fama-Macbeth (FMB) regressions and report the average coefficients and R 2 from quarterly cross-sectional regressions with Newey-West tstatistics. In pooled regressions the t-statistics reported are based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for descriptions of variables. RPPEG is risk premium based on the price-earnings-to-growth method. High PDisc is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm-level 1 coefficient from the following: = 0 + 1 + is in the highest quartile, 0 otherwise. PDisc is a firm-level measure of disclosure policy. The coefficient is estimated using rollingwindow regressions over the previous 8 quarters which reduces the sample size to 49,293 firm-quarters. VDisc (MDisc) is the total number of items classified as voluntary (not classified as voluntary) disclosed in the firm's 8-K filings. We use two groups of firms identified as being BelowThreshold. Lowest Cross-Sectional LTG Quartile is an indicator for whether the firm is in the lowest quartile of I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts. Each quarter we sort firms into quartiles on the basis of long-term growth and then combine the firms in the lowest quartile. Lowest Within-Industry LTG Quartile is an indicator for whether the firm is in the lowest quartile of I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts within its industry. Each quarter we sort firms into quartiles on the basis of their long-term growth within each industry, and then combine the firms in the lowest quartile across all industries into one group. The control variables Xt include Size, Beta, Leverage, and B/P in all specifications. In columns (1) and (3) we use Fama-Macbeth (FMB) regressions and report the average coefficients and R 2 s from quarterly cross-sectional regressions with Newey-West t-statistics. In columns (2) and (4) we use pooled regressions and report t-statistics that are based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for descriptions of variables.
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